INTRODUCTION
My mind is made up. I will have no more to do with this class of business. I can do business in Court, but I can not, and will not, follow executions all over the world.
-Abraham Lincoln, as a practicing attorney, expressing his frustration over his inability to collect on a judgment.' Imagine a typical lawsuit. The suit takes place in Maryland. The plaintiff is from Maryland. The defendant is from Bermuda. The events leading to the suit-say, breach of contract-took place in Maryland. Maryland's jurisdiction is not an issue. At trial, the plaintiff prevails.
FORDHAM LA WREVIEW judgment creditors to New York or, conversely, scare off garnishees such as banks from doing business within the state. 8 Equally important is the concern regarding the constitutional validity of the exercises of state power sanctioned by Koehler. Although judicial analysis of state jurisdiction has changed shapes over the years, it is limited by vague concepts such as "fairness." 9 Accordingly, as extraterritorial postjudgment garnishments inherently raise jurisdictional concerns, real questions might exist about the fairness of permitting a judgment debtor's assets to be garnished in a jurisdiction other than where the assets are located. 10 A proper analysis of the Koehler decision, and its possible implications, requires a background understanding of the issues the decision raises. Part I of this Comment discusses the evolution of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdictional analysis. This will be relevant in order to understand fully the due process and state power concerns raised by the Koehler case. Part I also explains the garnishment procedure and how different courts have interpreted the jurisdictional basis for such proceedings. Part II details the factual background of the Koehler decision, the arguments and rationales put forth by both parties, and the court's majority and dissenting decisions. Part III dissects the Koehler holding into two issues: postjudgment due process considerations and extraterritorial garnishments. This Comment concludes that the majority's holding in Koehler was correct in finding that typical prejudgment due process concerns should not apply to postjudgment garnishment proceedings. Further, Koehler properly held that New York courts may garnish property outside of their territorial borders.
I. BACKGROUND ON STATE JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS AND POSTJUDGMENT GARNISHMENTS
Part L.A briefly discusses the constitutional origins of due process concerns.
Part I.A.l specifically discusses the Supreme Court's in personam jurisdictional analysis. Part I.A.2 discusses the Supreme Court's in rem jurisdictional analysis. Part I.B describes the postjudgment garnishment procedure and how different courts and commentators have differed in its definition and classification. Part I.C discusses the distinction authorities draw between prejudgment and postjudgment procedures and how, if at all, the distinction changes a court's due process analysis.
Id. (noting that the Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd
. decision "can make New York a mecca for judgment creditors-or, on the contrary, a badlands for garnishees"). A somewhat analogous concern has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of child visitation rights. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978) (finding that a state's broad exercise of jurisdiction over an absent parent would "discourage parents from entering into reasonable visitation agreements").
9. See infra Part I.A. Understanding the jurisdictional and due process concerns raised by the
Koehler decision requires a closer look at the basic themes of the area. The
Supreme Court has established the proper analysis of state court jurisdiction.
Jurisdictional analysis, however, may be as difficult to understand as a "thousand-piece jigsaw puzzle," at least in part, because the method of evaluating and determining a state's exercise of jurisdiction has taken different shapes over time. 1 2 Yet, the consistent overriding concern has been to permit states only to exercise jurisdiction in a manner that comports with the U.S. Constitution. Although not expressly stated, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which ensures that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"' 3 has been understood to limit the valid exercise of state jurisdiction.
14 Thus, the Supreme Court's historical treatment of the Due Process Clause, as it pertains to jurisdictional matters, is directly relevant to the arguments of the Koehler parties highlighted in this Comment. 15 In Koehler, the parties differed as to whether the garnishing (1950) ("The basic principle that in our federal system the courts of a state must confine their action to persons or property having some physical connection with its territory has been embedded in the due-process and full-faith-and-credit clauses of the Federal Constitution."). Equally as relevant to the enforcement of sister state judgments is the fact that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution guarantees valid judgments from one state will be recognized in another state. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979) ; see also Botz v. Helvering, 134 F.2d 538, 544 (8th Cir. 1943) (noting that the Full Faith and Credit provision is applicable in federal courts). Accordingly, a judgment rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction over a defendant is invalid and may not be enforced in a sister state. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174 (1850) .
15. This Comment will focus on particular Supreme Court decisions in the area of due process and jurisdiction. For a more thorough history of the jurisprudence in the field, see Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam court needed jurisdiction over just the garnishee, or whether the court must also have jurisdiction over the debtor's property. 16 In order to provide context for the debate, a detailed overview and discussion of the development of both in personam and in rem jurisdictional analysis will be helpful.
1. In Personam Analysis: From "Is It There?" to "Is It Fair?" 17 The Supreme Court's Road from Pennoyer to International Shoe and Beyond For many years the case of Pennoyer v. Nefll 8 was the fundamental jurisprudence on the issue of state court jurisdiction. 19 In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court distinguished between two types of jurisdictional proceedings: in rem and in personam. 20 Suits "where the entire object of the action is to determine the personal rights and obligations of the defendants" are considered proceedings in personam. 2 1 On the other hand, suits in which "the object of the action is to reach and dispose of property in the State, or of some interest therein" are considered proceedings in rem. 22 The Supreme Court's decision in Pennoyer stood for the proposition that a state's valid exercise of its jurisdiction was limited by its territorial boundaries. 23 Therefore, control over the person or his property, satisfied 1846) ); see also BRILMAYER, supra note 19, at 23 (noting that "[t]he original due process limit was based on the finite power of the state court: the forum had no power to adjudicate a matter unless the person or property was somehow physically present"). A second and equally important principle set forth in Pennoyer was that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory." Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722. Thus, territorial boundaries not only limited a state's jurisdiction, but also served as a shield from the reach of sister states. However, at least one author has criticized the common understanding that In International Shoe, the appellant, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri, sold shoes in various states across the country. 30 Although the company sold shoes in the state of Washington, it maintained no offices there nor made any contracts within In holding that the shoe company was subject to Washington's courts' jurisdiction, 34 the Supreme Court set forth what has become known as the "minimum contacts" test for exercising jurisdiction. This test, in certain cases, permits the extension of state court jurisdiction beyond the territorial borders to persons located outside the state. 35 The decision in International Shoe undeniably expanded the jurisdictional reach of state courts.
36
The Court began its opinion by referencing its previous decision in Pennoyer and its holding that jurisdiction was defined by a state's territorial limits. 37 However, in noting that methods of personal service had since changed, the Court held,
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
38
The Court elaborated that not just any contact with the forum state would suffice. 39 Instead, courts should focus on the quality and quantity of the contacts.
40
Since International Shoe, the Court has continued to elaborate upon its minimum contacts analysis. In addition to assessing the nature of the contacts, courts must also consider (1) the inconvenience of hailing the defendant into the state to defend himself, 4 1 (2) the forum state's interest in 31. Id adjudicating the dispute, 4 2 (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, 43 (4) "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies," ' 44 and (5) the interest of the states collectively in furthering fundamental social policies. 45 Particularly, the Court has held that due process requires there be "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 4 6 This concept has resonated from another element of the minimum contacts analysis: the defendant's contacts with the forum state must not be accidental, fraudulent, or the result of someone else's actions. 47 The Court disagreed. 64 Noting that a state law provided for the attachment of such debt, the Court reasoned that "if the garnishee be found in [the] State ... the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over him, and can garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of the plaintiff. '65 In so holding, the Court declared that "[t]he obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies him wherever he goes."
' 66 This became known as the "debt-follows-the-debtor" rule. 6 7 Accordingly, under this rule, the debt-or property-owed to a judgment creditor by a judgment debtor could be "found" wherever the judgment debtor, or his garnishee, may be. which vastly changed the conceptual framework of determining a state's valid exercise of in rem jurisdiction. 70 The Court in Shaffer was asked to determine the constitutionality of a state statute that allowed the state's courts to obtain jurisdiction over a non resident defendant by securing his property within the state. 71 In this case Heitner brought suit against Shaffer, a non resident of Delaware, for acts which took place in Oregon.
72
Along with his complaint, Heitner sought to obtain jurisdiction over Shaffer by sequestering stock he held in a Delaware corporation. 75 The Court then explained that asserting jurisdiction over a thing is really, in a way, asserting jurisdiction "'over the interests of persons in a thing."' 76 In declaring the Delaware law unconstitutional, the Court extended International Shoe's "minimum contacts" analysis to determinations of in rem jurisdiction. 7 7 Accordingly, the Court stated, "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny." 78 In doing so, the Court held that the decisions in Harris and Pennoyer, to the extent they were inconsistent with the Shaffer standard, were overruled. 79 The opinion of Shaffer thus makes it very clear that whether or not a proceeding is considered in rem or in personam, the standard for jurisdiction is the same: the defendant's connection with the adjudicating forum must be sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" standard set forth in International Shoe. 80 80. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207 ("[I]n order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising 'jurisdiction over the straightforward, a footnote in the opinion has created much confusion and speculation. In this footnote, the Court stated, Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original matter.
8 1
Footnote thirty-six has become incredibly relevant in the analysis of postjudgment jurisdiction. A literal reading of the footnote suggests that a judgment creditor may garnish a judgment debtor's property wherever it may be, regardless of whether or not the judgment debtor maintains the requisite minimum contacts with the garnishing forum. Many courts and commentators have adopted this interpretation. 82 As one commentator believes, footnote thirty-six recognizes the long-standing concept in U.S. jurisprudence that one may enforce a judgment in a jurisdiction other than that which rendered the judgment.
83
But does the language "where the defendant has property" mean that an enforcing court must actually have the property to be executed upon within interests of persons in a thing.' The standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe."). usually be brought wherever property of the defendant is found, without any necessary connection between the underlying action and the property, or between the defendant and the forum."); see also Vernon, supra note 24, at 1007 (citing Shaffer's footnote thirty-six as evidence that "[tihe Court in Shaffer specifically provided that proceedings to realize on sister state judgments are exempt from the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe"). Federal circuits, however, have disagreed as to whether or not footnote thirty-six requires that the property or assets with the jurisdiction be related to the underlying cause of action. Compare Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F. 83. See Maltz, supra note 49, at 1046. Earl Maltz states, One of the difficulties with Marshall's analysis is that on its face it threatens a mainstay of American jurisprudence-the concept that one can always enforce a judgment obtained against a defendant in one state by levying against property located in another state.... The body of the Shaffer opinion suggests that in such a case the judgment could be enforced only if the judgment debtor has minimum contacts with the state where the property is located. Such a rule would represent a radical change from current practice.
Marshall brushed off this problem rather cavalierly in [footnote thirty-six].
its jurisdiction? This may seem like a fair reading. However, as this Comment discusses below, courts have interpreted the footnote as allowing judgment debtors to be ordered to turn over their extraterritorial assets to satisfy the existing judgment. 84 This discrepancy demonstrates the ambiguity in the Shaffer footnote. This confusion may be further inflated when it is difficult to locate precisely certain property. For example, certain types of intangible property, such as stock or wages, are not as easy to locate as real property.
5
As one commentator has stated, the Shaffer Court in footnote thirty-six was probably imagining a relatively standard execution of a judgment against real property. 86 But the author fairly addresses a more interesting and complex scenario. 87 Incredibly, this scenario is, in large part, the issue presented in Koehler. To paraphrase his hypothetical: Imagine if a judgment debtor lives in New York, where he works at a branch of the ABC Corporation, which is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business there, but also has branches in numerous states, including Florida. May a judgment creditor garnish the debtor's wages in Florida? 88 Put another way: If that same judgment debtor maintains a checking account with Chase Bank in New York, may the creditor garnish this account at a local Chase branch in, say, Kentucky?
This scenario raises a variety of questions and concerns. To begin, it is unclear whether or not such garnishment proceedings are in personam or in rem. Further, it is further unclear whether this even matters after Shaffer. 8 9 Perhaps one could argue that in light of the Supreme Court's jurisdictional jurisprudence, it would not be "fair" to permit such garnishments. This, however, assumes that fairness is a concern in postjudgment proceedings, 84 . See, e.g., infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. It is important to note that these cases all dealt with judgment debtors directly, not garnishees. This is in part why the Koehler decision, which dealt with a garnishee, is groundbreaking. This distinction was a unlike real or tangible personal property, has no physical characteristics that would serve as a basis for assigning it to a particular locality. The location assigned to it depends on what action is to be taken with reference to it."' (quoting In re Waits' Estate, 146 P.2d 5, 8 (Cal. 1944))). As Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo once stated, the location of intangible property should be determined based upon "a common sense appraisal of the requirements of justice and convenience in particular conditions." Severnoe Sec. Corp 92 it was at the heart of the debate between the parties in Koehler. 93 For example, if typical prejudgment fairness concerns restrain courts in postjudgment proceedings, it might hardly seem "fair" to permit a New York court to garnish a Bermuda resident's assets located in Bermuda. 94 Understanding the issues that are raised by postjudgment extraterritorial garnishments inherently demands a basic overview of the garnishment procedure. As will be evident, how courts and practitioners understand garnishments to operate has an immense impact on the possible reach of such garnishments. The next section of this Comment will explore the themes and issues in the area that are relevant to the Koehler decision.
B. The "Giant" in the Enforcement Procedure. What Is a Garnishment? 95
In litigation, the declaration of a judgment does not essentially end the dispute. Once the plaintiff wins and a judgment is rendered, the judgment must now be enforced. This, unfortunately, is not always an easy process. Garnishments are a useful tool to assist judgment creditors in collecting on their judgments. A garnishment is a proceeding brought by a judgment creditor to collect a debt-or enforce an existing judgment-when such a judgment is not voluntarily paid. , at 3 ("There is far more written and thought about by courts and lawyers with respect to issues arising out of the commencement of a lawsuit than there is with respect to procedural issues arising out of occurrences that take place near the end of lawsuits.").
93. See generally infra Part II.B. 1-2. 94. This argument appears to have been endorsed by Justice Stevens in the context of prejudgment attachment. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("One who purchases shares of stock on the open market can hardly be expected to know that he has thereby become subject to suit in a forum remote from his residence and unrelated to the transaction.").
95. Siegel, supra note 7 (noting that a garnishee is a "giant" in the field of enforcement). The term garnishment is confusingly used by courts to describe both a prejudgment tool used to attach property and a postjudgment remedy to satisfy an existing judgment. Accordingly, the term has very different meanings and requires completely different analyses depending on how it is used. For the purpose of this Comment, unless otherwise stated, any mention of garnishment refers to the postjudgment context. 97. See Laurence, supra note 79, at 356-57. Garnishments, in a sense, reflect the reality that many judgment debtors may take evasive measures to avoid the enforcement of judgments against them. See, e.g., Henry E. Rakowski, Enforcing Judgments, J. NASSAU COUNTY B. Ass'N, Oct. 2002, at 3, 22 ("It is very unlikely that a debtor will 'hold still' and the debt due by either attaching the debtor's property directly, or by proceeding against a third party-a garnishee-who owes a debt to the debtor or is in lawful possession of the debtor's property. 98 Garnishment proceedings are an entirely new suit-or, a "lawsuit within a lawsuit." 99 In that sense, garnishments are a type of attachment, 1 0 0 which may be brought wherever the property of the debtor is found, regardless of the connection, if any, between the underlying action, the debtor, and the forum state.
1
The parties in Koehler disagreed as to whether garnishment proceedings require in personam or in rem jurisdiction.
1 0 2 Some courts have considered garnishments to require in rem jurisdiction. 10 3 Some courts have defined postjudgment garnishment proceedings as a cross between in personam and in rem. 104 At least one court has described such proceedings to be "the nature of a proceeding in rem although it moves against a garnishee in personam." 10 5 Accordingly, not only must the garnishee be within the jurisdiction of the enforcing court but so must the property.1 06 allow his bank accounts to be restrained. The debtor should be presumed to actively engage in tactics designed to conceal his assets.").
98. This is an incredibly important disagreement.
For example, if the enforcement of a judgment requires that the judgment debtor be afforded typical prejudgment due process protections, it would hardly seem fair to allow a Bermuda resident's stock certificates, located in a Bermuda bank, to be garnished by a Maryland creditor in New York. Put more simply, if due process considerations as to the judgment debtor restrict postjudgment garnishments, the Koehler decision may very well be unconstitutional.1 0 8
Judge William Houston Brown has noted that "there are some obvious differences between postjudgment and prejudgment garnishment."' 1 9 To begin, as one court has vaguely stated, jurisdiction in postjudgment proceedings is "wider." 11 0 This should, however, be rather obvious: a court's role differs significantly depending upon whether a valid judgment already exists. 111 In such cases, the court is then only being asked to enforce the judgment, rather than to determine whether or not the defendant has in some way wronged the plaintiff. 112 Accordingly, "the procedural impediments faced by a creditor seeking prejudgment garnishment of the debtor's property or debts are in large part removed.'
113
This was the case in Koehler. The validity of the judgment against the judgment debtor was not at issue. 114 Instead, the judgment creditor was merely asking the court to assist him in satisfying his judgment. 115 Thus, the role of the court is one way in which there is an obvious difference between prejudgment and postjudgment proceedings. 119. See Laurence, supra note 79, at 372 ("'Fair play and substantial justice' should function as the hallmark of postjudgment enforcement process .... "). Therefore, the author noted, "a garnishment is only proper in a jurisdiction which has the constitutionally minimum contacts with both the garnishee and the defendant." Id. at 370. The author also notes that while requiring a due process inquiry for postjudgment proceedings would be "cumbersome," it would limit the amount of forum shopping. App. 1979 ) (same); Cappalli, supra, note 111, at 115 ("The executing court should not do a full contacts probe because that body is exercising such limited power against the judgment debtor. That court is not assessing liability and measuring compensation but merely making property available to satisfy the liquidated claim."); Vernon, supra note 24, at 1008 ("The exemption of proceedings to realize on judgments from the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe is pragmatically necessary if judgment debtors are to be prevented from shielding their assets from judgment creditors by shipping the assets to a state with which the underlying litigation had no prior connection.").
judgments. 121 Accordingly, one commentator argues that the Shaffer Court had a "very different view of what is 'fair' in postjudgment attachment actions and 'greatly relaxed' the minimum contacts requirement in such actions." 122 The author then argues that the proper analysis for an enforcing court is a "rear view mirror" test to determine if the rendering court had proper jurisdiction over the defendant. 123 If so, no further inquiry is required by the enforcing court. 1 24 How, if at all, the Shaffer opinion may change postjudgment garnishment analysis has yet to be fully realized. This is, in part, because enforcement proceedings do not garner much attention in the legal community. 125 Instead, and perhaps understandably, most attention is focused on the events leading up to the judgment. 126 This has led to a degree of uncertainty regarding the proper analysis of these proceedings. prejudgment are also relevant postjudgment. 130 However, even authorities that do not require a minimum contacts inquiry postjudgment have seemed to require, at least by implication, that the property to be garnished be within the garnishing jurisdiction.' 3 1 Nonetheless, in Koehler, the New York Court of Appeals perhaps paved its own course by holding that a court with jurisdiction over a garnishee but not the judgment debtor may order the garnishee to transfer extraterritorial assets in its possession into the state. 132 Such a holding raises serious due process and policy concerns. 133 A better understanding of both the reasoning of the Koehler decision, as well as its potential impact, demands a closer look at the case itself. 139. New York's C.P.L.R. 5225 says, in part, (a) Property in the possession of judgment debtor. Upon motion of the judgment creditor, upon notice to the judgment debtor, where it is shown that the judgment debtor is in possession or custody of money or other personal property in which he has an interest, the court shall order that the judgment debtor pay the money, or so much of it as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, to the judgment creditor and, if the amount to be so paid is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, to deliver any other personal property, or so much of it as is of sufficient value to satisfy the judgment, to a designated sheriff....
(b) Property not in the possession of judgment debtor. Upon a special proceeding commenced by the judgment creditor, against a person in possession or custody of money or other personal property in which the judgment debtor has an interest, or against a person who is a transferee of money or other personal property from the judgment debtor, where it is shown that the judgment debtor is entitled to the possession of such property or that the judgment creditor's rights to the property are superior to those of the transferee, the court shall require such person to pay the money, or so much of it as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment, to the judgment creditor and, if the amount to be so paid is insufficient to satisfy the judgment, to deliver any other personal property, or so much of it as is of sufficient value to satisfy the judgment, to a designated sheriff. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5225 (McKinney 1997). much litigation, the Bank eventually consented to the personal jurisdiction of New York's courts. 140 In 1993, the district court issued an order that directed the Bank to turn over the stock certificates in Bermuda to Koehler.1 4 1 However, in 2005, the district court dismissed Koehler's petition, basing its decision upon the "crucial fact" that the stock certificates were located outside the court's territorial jurisdiction, and reasoning that New York could not attach property located outside the state. 142 Accordingly, the court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the judgment debtor's stock certificates. 43 Koehler appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 144 which observed that it was unclear whether or not New York was permitted to order a garnishee subject to its jurisdiction to deliver assets that are in its possession but not located in New York.
14 5 Although it perceived that nothing in the statutory text would prohibit such an order, 146 the court, by certified question, asked the New York Court of Appeals to determine "whether a court sitting in New York may ... order a bank over which it has personal jurisdiction to deliver stock certificates owned by a judgment debtor (or cash equal to their value) to a judgment creditor ... when those stock certificates are located outside New York."
The next section will examine the arguments made by the parties in their respective briefs.
B. Arguments from the Briefs

Koehler
In his brief, Koehler pointed to several cases and commentaries interpreting section 5225(a) for support of the proposition that garnishment proceedings are proceedings in personam, requiring only jurisdiction over 140 145. Id. at 85-86 ("It seems clear that a court sitting in New York, that has personal jurisdiction over a judgment debtor, may order the judgment debtor himself to deliver property into New York. It is less clear that courts have the authority to order a person or entity other than the judgment debtor to deliver assets into New York, when that person or entity is located in a foreign jurisdiction." (citing Gryphon Domestic VI, LLC v. APP Int'l 146. See id. at 86 ("[W]e see no principled reason why a court in New York should not be able to order a garnishee that has submitted to its personal jurisdiction to deliver property within its control.").
147. Id. at 87.
the person-that is, the garnishee. 14 8 Furthermore, Koehler noted, it was established law that judgment debtors may be ordered to turn over out-ofstate property. 149 For example, in Miller v. Doniger, 150 the judgment debtor maintained several bank accounts outside the state of New York. 151 Despite the fact that some of the accounts were in the possession of relatives, the court ordered that they be transferred into the state in order to satisfy the existing judgment. 152 More importantly, however, Koehler pointed to the decision in Morgenthau v. Avion Resources Ltd.
153
In Morgenthau, the court noted, although in dicta, that garnishees could be ordered to transfer assets in their possession into the state. 154 Although these decisions all involved the court's power over a judgment debtor, not a garnishee, Koehler argued that such a distinction was inappropriate. 155 For support, Koehler asserted that nothing in section 5225(b) prohibits a court from reaching property located outside the state. 156 Moreover, looking at the language of the CPLR statute, Koehler noted that section 5225(a), dealing with judgment debtors, is "identical" to section 5225(b), dealing with garnishees. 157 The only distinction, Koehler asserted, is that section (a) proceeds by motion whereas section (b) requires a special proceeding to establish jurisdiction over the garnishee. 158 Other than that, Koehler noted, the operational language is the same.
159 Thus, if it was well-established that judgment debtors could be ordered to turn over out-of-state property,16 0 so too could garnishees. 161 Citing to Shaffer's footnote thirty-six, 162 Koehler noted that "there is an important distinction between pre-judgment attachment and post-judgment collection proceedings." 163 Professor David Siegel has explained this theory as permitting courts to find the assets' situs wherever the garnishee is located. See NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 79, § 491 ("Finding the garnishee is just another way of finding the asset's 'situs': if the garnishee has a New York presence, the debtor's asset in the garnishee's hands will usually be found to have a New York situs, too."). If this were so, the Koehler court could have relied upon this theory to explain that the debtor's assets were really located-with the garnishee-in New York. This perhaps would have simplified the reasoning and allowed the court to resolve the issue without really addressing it directly. This reasoning, however, mirrors the outmoded "debt-follows-thedebtor" theory of Harris v. Balk. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text. While some courts have suggested that Harris's "debt-follows-the-debtor" theory still applies postjudgment, see supra note 79, this raises some serious practical concerns. See Laurence supra note 79, at 375, 383-84 (noting that such a rationale would essentially create a situs for such debts anywhere the garnishee is present and impose serious practical complications for nationally operating entities).
162. Thus, Koehler noted, applying Shaffer's decision to postjudgment garnishments would be contradictory: not only would it conflict with the statutory language of the CPLR, 167 but it would also directly contradict the holding in Lenchyshyn. 1 68 Koehler also cited several policy considerations in support of permitting such garnishments. First, Koehler noted, requiring that the judgment debtor's property be located within the enforcing state would merely permit the debtor to evade the enforcement of the judgment. 169 All the debtor would need to do is move his property to a state other than the one being asked to enforce the judgment. 170 This would impede the courts' desires to see that all valid judgments are enforced. 17 1 Also, Koehler argued, courts should automatically favor the interests of the judgment creditor over the judgment debtor. 172 After all, a court has already determined that the judgment debtor has in some way harmed the judgment creditor. Nor, Koehler argued, would an order requiring the Bank to turn over the assets located in another territory "violate the sovereignty" of that territory. 174 While a prejudgment attachment would require a New York sheriff to enter the other state and secure the property, a clear violation of state sovereignty, 17 5 turnover orders merely act against the garnishee who is already present within New York and subject to its jurisdiction.' 76 The court would only be ordering the garnishee, over which it already has jurisdiction, to bring property in the garnishee's possession into the state. 177 And, as a result of its "presence" within New York, Koehler argued, the Bank was legally obligated to obey the turnover order. 178 
The Bank
The Bank asserted that garnishment proceedings are "'in the nature of actions in rem, and are especially so when they proceed without jurisdiction of the person of the debtor."" ' 179 Furthermore, the Bank asserted, it was well-established law in New York that in prejudgment attachment proceedings the property must be within the jurisdiction of the court. 180 Thus, the Bank asserted, the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the judgment because it lacked jurisdiction over the assets. Nor, the Bank asserted, did anything in the language of the CPLR statute indicate that it was intended to have extraterritorial reach. 184 In fact, canons of construction would indicate that no such language should be read into the statute. 185 Simply, if the legislature had intended section 5225(b) to have extraterritorial reach it would have added such language to the statute. 186 Permitting such garnishments, the Bank also warned, would raise serious due process concerns. 187 Specifically, the Bank cited to the Supreme Court's decisions in both International Shoe and Shaffer. 188 In these cases, the Bank noted, the Supreme Court had made it clear that all exercises of judicial jurisdiction must satisfy the minimum contacts test. 18 9 The facts, the Bank argued, proved that New York's contacts with this matter were "weak, at best.' 9 0
Lastly, allowing the garnishment of out-of-state property would create serious policy implications. 19 1 Particularly, the Bank cautioned, any financial property held by banks worldwide would be vulnerable to garnishment in New York if that bank had a branch or subsidiary in the 182 . See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text. 183. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 22-23 ("The fundamental flaw of Koehler's argument is that it fails to recognize the distinction between the broad, plenary power a court has when the judgment debtor is subject to personal jurisdiction, as compared to the more limited power it has in a special proceeding to garnish property."). The Court began its analysis by distinguishing prejudgment attachment proceedings from postjudgment enforcement proceedings. 19 8 Prejudgment attachments, the court noted, require jurisdiction over the property. 199 Postjudgment attachments, on the other hand, are proceedings in personam 05-2378-cv) (noting that such garnishments would deter "foreign customers who do not wish their assets to be exposed in New York" and "would further increase the pressure on ... banks not to operate in the State"). The Clearing House also expressed concern that such garnishments would create "a rush on the New York courts to obtain such orders," essentially flooding the courts "with proceedings arising from controversies and debts that have nothing to do with New York." Id. at 26. Forum shopping would be even more likely, Clearing House asserted, because allowing such garnishments would create a serious conflict with decisions in several other states. See id. at 27-28 & n. 15. These concerns have been recognized in recent commentaries on the case. See Brown & Rotenberg-Schwartz, supra note 133; Siegel, supra note 7.
193. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 36; see also NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 79, § 485 ("A judgment creditor may find that she is not alone in pursuit of the debtor, who may be in such financial extremis that his creditors are legion. At this point the topic becomes what law school curricula often denominated 'creditors' rights', a battleground that determines priorities in the assets of a declining debtor."). 195. Brief for Respondent the Bank of Bermuda Ltd., supra note 152, at 37. This concern has been addressed by at least one commentator. See Laurence, supra note 79, at 381 (noting that "[rjeversing footnote 36 to require a due process inquiry" postjudgment would be "cumbersome," but supporting the idea regardless). For arguments against requiring such due process analysis postjudgment, see Cappalli, supra note 111, at 114-15; Vernon, supra note 24, at 1007-8. [Vol. 78 and thus only require jurisdiction over the person. 200 Once jurisdiction has been established over the person, the court explained, it may order the adherence to its orders by proceeding in personam against the person. 20 1 Accordingly, since the Bank had consented to the jurisdiction of the court, 202 that was all that was necessary to order it to turn over the assets.
203
Turning to the CPLR statute, the court noted that section fifty-two "contains no express territorial limitation barring the entry of a turnover order that requires a garnishee to transfer money or property into New York. '20 4 It would be improper to read such a restriction into the statutory language, the court noted, because it would have been "easy" for the legislature to have added such a restriction into the statutory language. The majority then proceeded to address the alleged distinction between garnishees and judgment debtors. The court acknowledged the settled rule that judgment debtors may be ordered to bring their out-of-state assets into the state. 206 The court then dismissed the Bank's assertion that, absent jurisdiction over the judgment debtor, courts are limited by their in rem jurisdiction over the debtor's property. 20 7 Nothing in the CPLR statute, the court explained, supported such a proposition. 20 8 In fact, the court noted, the statute contemplates, in identical language, that a defendant subject to the court's jurisdiction-regardless of whether he is a judgment debtor or garnishee-could be ordered to turn over property. For support, the court pointed to a recent amendment to section 5224 of the CPLR that gave it extraterritorial reach. Id. The court saw this as support for the proposition that the remainder of section fifty-two was intended to have the same extraterritorial effect. Id. Interestingly, however, the majority failed to recognize, and the dissent failed to argue, that this recent amendment may indicate that the legislature purposely left the language of 5225 as is because it did not wish for it to have any extraterritorial reach. Similarly, just as a limitation could not be read into the statute, the majority ignores the fact that such an expansion could not either. 
D. The Dissent
In a strong dissent, three judges expressed concern over the majority's expansive interpretation. 2 1 0 Such a reading, the dissent warned, "is unsupported by any precedent in New York or, apparently, in any other jurisdiction." 2 11 Perhaps even more importantly, the dissent noted, the majority decision's "policy implications are troubling, and ... may well be unconstitutional.
12
The dissent expressed concern that the majority's interpretation of the garnishment statute may exceed the State's jurisdictional powers as limited by the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. 2 13 Particularly, the dissent relied upon the holdings in International Shoe and Shaffer. 2 14 The dissent pointed to Shaffer's footnote thirty-six as indication that postjudgment garnishments focus on the location of the property, and thus are proceedings in rem. 215 Although the dissenters conceded that the Supreme Court has never applied International Shoe to postjudgment proceedings, 2 16 they argued that the majority's approach might very well fail the standard set forth in International Shoe.
17
For support, the dissenters pointed to the recent decision by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Livingston v. Naylor. 218 In Livingston, the judgment creditor had obtained a money judgment against the judgment debtor, a resident of North Carolina, in a North Carolina court. 2 19 The judgment debtor had been employed by Marriott Hotels in both North Carolina and Maryland. 220 After enrolling his judgment in Maryland, the judgment creditor sought to garnish the wages of the debtor in Maryland by garnishing the Marriott Hotel there. 2 21 The Livingston court first dismissed the judgment debtor's claim that the court lacked power to issue the garnishment because it lacked jurisdiction over him. 222 Thus, the court determined that the debtor's assets within the state, if any, were subject to garnishment.
23
The Livingston court distinguished, however, between the wages earned by the judgment debtor while employed within Maryland and those earned while employed within North Carolina. 224 The court expressed "little concern" about garnishing the debtor's wages earned by him while employed within Maryland. 225 However, the court noted that the wages earned by the judgment debtor, while a resident of North Carolina and while employed in North Carolina, were not within Maryland's jurisdiction, even though the garnishee employer was. 226 Because the wages were not within its jurisdiction, the court held that due process prohibited it from garnishing the North Carolina wages. 227 Thus, to garnish the wages earned by the debtor while employed in North Carolina, the court held, the judgment creditor would have to go to that state's courts. 228 Nor could the Koehler dissenters find any support for the majority's decision in the language of the CPLR statute. Looking at the statute, the dissenters noted that the relevant sections in no way provided for an extraterritorial interpretation. 229 The power to conduct such extraterritorial garnishments, the dissent noted, is simply a question "that the text of the statutes does not answer." 
226.
Id. at 53-54. The court also rejected the judgment creditor's argument that Harris's "debt-follows-the-debtor" rule still applies to postjudgment garnishments and that the judgment debtor's wages could be garnished anywhere and everywhere that Marriott Hotels did business. See id. at 52-53. For support, the court cited an analogous holding in Williamson v. Williamson, which prohibited a garnishment of the debtor's wages because the wages due to the debtor by the garnishee could not practically be located everywhere the garnishee-employer, the U.S. Army, was. 275 S.E.2d 42 (Ga. 1981). Some courts, however, have applied Harris's rule to postjudgment garnishments. permitting the assets to be found wherever the garnishee or debtor himself is. See supra note 79.
227. Livingston, 920 A.2d at 51 ("With respect to wages that are earned by a North Carolina resident while working at facilities that are wholly within the State of North Carolina ... and in the absence of some other connection between Maryland and either the North Carolina wage-earner or the underlying controversy that resulted in the original North Carolina judgment, we recognize a lack of fair play and substantial justice in permitting such wages to be garnished by operation of a Maryland court order."). This holding seems to be in accord with a literal reading of the Restatement's law on international judgment enforcement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. h (1987) ("[O]nce a judgment has been rendered in a forum having jurisdiction, the prevailing party is entitled to have it satisfied out of the judgment debtor's assets wherever they may be located." (emphasis added)). Interestingly, the Livingston court conceded that Shaffer was a prejudgment decision. Livingston, 920 A.2d at 47. Citing to footnote thirty-six, the court also admitted that this language indicated that prejudgment and postjudgment analysis would differ. This, the dissent explained, made sense: judgment debtors, who can physically control the property in ways garnishees cannot, could otherwise move their property around in order to frustrate the enforcement of the judgment. 233 Garnishees, such as the Bank, on the other hand, would have no such interest in doing this.
234
The dissent also looked to a somewhat analogous case decided by the Second Circuit. 2 35 In United States v. First National City Bank, 236 the United States sought to garnish a Uruguayan corporation's assets from a New York bank. 2 37 The assets were deposited in the bank's branch outside of the United States. 23 8 The Second Circuit refused to permit such a garnishment on the grounds that a "garnishor obtains no greater right against the garnishee than the garnishee's creditor had. ' 239 Thus, if the corporation could not require the overseas deposits be paid in New York, neither could the United States as creditor. 240 Analogizing to the present case, the dissent noted that there was no reason to believe that the judgment debtor here could have forced the Bank to deliver the stock certificates into New York. Additionally, the dissent warned, the majority's decision created a chance that judgment creditors would flood to New York in order to enforce their judgments. 242 All that would be required now is that the garnishee institution have a branch or subsidiary operating in New York. 243 It would be, as the dissenters said, "irrelevant whether New York has any relationship with the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor or the dispute 231. See id. at 832-33. between them." 244 Such an opportunity, the dissent cautioned, would be a "recipe for trouble." 245 As this Comment should make clear, the debate between the parties in Koehler-which is in large part echoed by the majority and dissenting opinions-reflects a significant disagreement about how postjudgment garnishments should be analyzed. This disagreement, on such an important step in the litigation process, is worrisome. Incredibly, much of the confusion and debate can properly be traced back to a single footnote in the Supreme Court's Shaffer opinion.
246 Accordingly, the Koehler decision can be seen as an opinion synthesizing some of the main issues in postjudgment jurisprudence. And, while the court's dismissal of due process concerns is in accord with an established reading of the footnote, the sanction of an extraterritorial garnishment breaks ground from a similarly established understanding.
Part III of this Comment takes a closer look at the holdings of the Koehler decision and the issues it addressed. Specifically, this Comment will address the Koehler court's treatment of two issues: postjudgment due process considerations and extraterritorial garnishments. This Comment concludes that the Koehler decision was correctly decided, as it reflects both a continuing trend in jurisdictional jurisprudence and realistically addresses-and certainly ameliorates-the impediments faced by judgment creditors in collecting on their judgments. Despite these concerns, the Koehler decision was correctly decided. First, the decision follows the trend of broadening jurisdictional analysis. Second, the decision serves the noble purpose of assisting judgment creditors in satisfying their rightfully earned judgments.
The Koehler decision can properly be divided as addressing two separate, yet intertwined, issues: postjudgment due process and extraterritorial garnishments. A closer look at each issue separately will make clear that the Koehler decision was founded upon sound legal and practical considerations.
A. Postjudgment Jurisdictional Due Process Considerations: A "Greatly
Relaxed" Approach 25 1
The majority correctly, although surprisingly, refrained from engaging in an extensive due process analysis in its decision. 2 52 This is justified: typical prejudgment due process concerns should be irrelevant in postjudgment garnishment proceedings. This holding has a legal basis in Shaffer's footnote thirty-six, which implicitly recognizes the different roles between adjudicating courts and enforcing courts. 2 53 The plain language of this footnote indicates that the Supreme Court did not intend enforcement proceedings to be subject to typical prejudgment due process scrutiny.
54
Since Shaffer, many courts and commentators have adopted this approach. 255 Policy considerations strongly support putting aside prejudgment due process concerns in postjudgment garnishment proceedings. To begin, courts must understand their role in a garnishment proceeding-to satisfy the judgment that the judgment creditor won against the judgment debtor in a previous action. 2 56 That is, there already exists a judgment against the defendant for some wrongdoing against the plaintiff. Accordingly, courts should favor the interests of judgment creditors in satisfying their outstanding judgment against the judgment debtor. 2 57 This lends favor to permitting courts to satisfy the existing judgment without delay caused by the debtor's due process concerns.
Moreover, requiring that a judgment debtor be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the enforcing court would enable judgment debtors to evade enforcement. 258 First, a judgment debtor could easily distance himself and his property from any connection to the enforcing state. 259 Essentially, the judgment debtor would tailor his contacts in a manner to avoid being subjected to the enforcing state's jurisdiction. Second, judgment debtors would be able to essentially relitigate the jurisdictional basis of the existing judgment. Litigating over the judgment debtor's contacts with the enforcing state would require the time and money of the litigants and the court. It would be burdensome on the courts because it is a fact-specific and time-consuming task. 260 This would further delay the satisfaction of the existing judgment and unfairly hinder the creditor's ability to satisfy his judgment. Judgment debtors deserve no such second bite at the apple. Enforcing courts should therefore adopt the "rearview mirror" approach: so long as the existing judgment was rendered by a court properly exercising jurisdiction, no further due process considerations are necessary. 262 
B. Extraterritorial Garnishment
The Koehler decision greatly expanded the reach of New York's postjudgment garnishment procedure to assets in the possession of a present garnishee but located outside of the state. While this holding may raise concerns about valid state powers, 263 the decision is justified upon both legal and practical considerations. First, the Supreme Court's jurisdictional jurisprudence has indicated a shift away from the traditional understanding of territorial boundaries as a limit of state power. 264 259. See Vernon, supra note 24, at 1008 ("The exemption of proceedings to realize on judgments from the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe is pragmatically necessary if judgment debtors are to be prevented from shielding their assets from judgment creditors by shipping the assets to a state with which the underlying litigation had no prior connection."). The Supreme Court in Shaffer also expressed such a concern that judgment debtors would try to avoid paying off the judgment. See Shaffer 433 U.S. at 210 (noting that a judgment debtor "'should not be able to avoid payment of his obligations by the expedient of removing his assets to a place where he is not subject to an in personam suit' (quoting debtors may be ordered to turn over extraterritorial assets. 26 5 The Koehler decision correctly held that it should make no difference whether the court is directing a garnishee or judgment debtor subject to its jurisdiction to turn over assets in its possession. Third, policy considerations, such as the courts' interests in enforcing judgments, strongly support the use of extraterritorial garnishments. This expanding jurisdictional theory has reflected the reality that, in a modem economy, the interests of courts may extend to persons or properties beyond their borders. 271 This is particularly the case in the postjudgment context, where a state court's power is considered to be greater than if it were exercising prejudgment power. 272 Moreover, postjudgment garnishments are procedurally different than prejudgment attachments. 273 Postjudgment garnishments, as is evident from the Koehler case, merely order the garnishee who has submitted itself to the enforcing court's jurisdiction, and is legally obligated to obey the enforcing court's orders, to transfer assets already in its possession in another state into the enforcing state. 274 Accordingly, such procedures do not require an agent or officer of the enforcing state to cross state lines, enter the territory where the assets are located, physically seize them, and bring them back to the enforcing state. This would, no doubt, raise serious state sovereignty issues. 275 It is established law that courts may order a judgment debtor to turn over out-of-state property. 277 While no New York court has permitted this for garnishees, 27 8 Koehler argued and the court rightly agreed that nothing should prohibit such an order. 279 Thus, the Koehler decision correctly dismissed this alleged distinction between judgment debtors and garnishees. 280 Courts should be able to order a party in postjudgment proceedings, whether the party is a judgment debtor or garnishee, to act upon assets in its possession but in another jurisdiction. Thus, if courts can order judgment debtors to transfer such assets, there is no reason to prohibit garnishees from doing the same. After all, parties subject to a court's jurisdiction are legally obligated to obey its orders.
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This certainly makes sense when one considers the nature of a garnishment proceeding. Garnishments are independent suits that name the garnishee as the defendant. 282 Accordingly, the garnishee is a real defendant and should be treated as such. And, if the judgment debtor as a real defendant in the initial litigation could be ordered to transfer extraterritorial assets, so too should the garnishee as a real defendant in the garnishment proceeding. 283 The Supreme Court has also indicated that courts need not be concerned about the judgment debtor in postjudgment garnishment proceedings-essentially, it is all about the garnishee. This is a desire that the entire legal community should share. However, the 276. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant Lee N. Koehler 284. See supra note 117. This is true, admittedly, to the extent that courts require judgment debtors be given notice of the garnishment before it is done. See NEW YORK PRACTICE, supra note 79, § 510.
285.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text. enforcement of judgments is a problem that has disturbed the legal system for a long time, as seen in Abraham Lincoln's expression of frustration almost a century-and-a-half ago. 2 86 Similarly frustrated judgment creditors throughout the nation, and particularly in New York, have longed for a decision like Koehler.
The Koehler decision is an incredibly powerful tool for judgment creditors to use in order to satisfy their judgments. Particularly, it has the potential to assist judgment creditors in reaching the assets of judgment debtors who have shielded their assets from garnishment by evasive maneuvering. If courts cannot reach assets outside of their jurisdiction, judgment debtors will simply relocate their assets every time a judgment creditor begins a garnishment proceeding in the jurisdiction where the assets are located. This is even more likely for intangible property, which can be relocated much easier and is more difficult to locate. 2 87 No judgment debtor should be able to get away with this. 2 88 The Koehler decision prevents this.
To be fair, the recent critics of the Koehler decision are not entirely misguided. First, as commentators have argued, this decision certainly makes New York courts more attractive for judgment creditors seeking satisfaction of their judgments. 289 However, if there is in fact a judgment creditor "gold rush" upon the courts, it would be a reflection of a much deeper problem: there are anxious judgment creditors out there who have been unable to satisfy their judgments. The Koehler decision, for better or worse, may be their savior. And, the satisfaction of valid and hard-earned judgments far outweighs the slight possible increase of foot traffic in New York's courts.
The second concern of these commentators is that the Koehler decision, by making corporations within New York's jurisdiction the possible garnishees of assets worldwide, might make New York a less attractive place for corporations to do business. 290 While maintaining the continuance of New York as a corporate and commercial headquarters is vital to the state's economy, the concern expressed is somewhat exaggerated. Put simply, it is very unlikely that corporations will close up their operations in New York because of this decision. The loss to the 286. See supra note I and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. With online banking, for example, a simple click of the mouse could transfer a judgment debtor's assets. 288 . This has long been a concern of the courts. See supra note 171; see also Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977) (noting that a judgment debtor "'should not be able to avoid payment of his obligations by the expedient of removing his assets to a place where he is not subject to an in personam suit' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 66 cmt. a (1971))). Although the Shaffer Court was addressing the postjudgment due process requirement, the theory is analogous to a judgment debtor removing his assets to a jurisdiction where an enforcing court cannot reach them.
289. See Brown & Rotenberg-Schwartz, supra note 133; Siegel, supra note 7. 290. See Brown & Rotenberg-Schwartz, supra note 133; Siegel, supra note 7.
corporations of the advantages of doing business within New York would far outweigh the occasional inconvenience of being a garnishee of out-ofstate property.
C. Don't Balk Too Soon: Can Harris v. Balk Help Us?
Some courts have perhaps crafted their own solution to this problem. These courts still apply Harris's "the-debt-follows-the-debtor" rule to postjudgment enforcement proceedings.
1
If the rule still applies to postjudgment garnishments, courts can avoid the issues litigated by the parties in Koehler merely by finding that such assets have a "presence" wherever the garnishee may be found. Thus, so long as the garnishee is subject to the enforcing court's jurisdiction, so too are the assets. This theory may make sense when applied to assets such as bank deposits, which might be "located" at any place they may be accessed, such as a bank branch or automated teller machine.
This theory, however, is too much of a legal fiction. Although it perhaps simplifies the role for a court addressing this issue, it does so in a vague and illusory way. A Texas resident's bank deposits in a Houston branch of a bank are not "located" in that same bank's New York branch once the Texan becomes a judgment debtor and the bank a garnishee. 292 To reason otherwise would demand an unreasonable stretch of the imagination, one that, at least for prejudgment purposes, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Shaffer when it overruled Harris. 293 The satisfaction of judgments must be founded upon practical and sound doctrine, for, as Siegel has stated, " [t] he enforcement of judgments is ruled by pragmatists. Theoreticians have no fun at this party." 294 Thus, Koehler must be recognized for what it clearly stands for-a significant decision that bravely charts its own course in the area of postjudgment garnishments. And, for better or for worse, it will certainly be exciting to see what, if any at all, impact the decision has. Also, given the numerous legal and practical issues raised by the majority's decision, it will be interesting to see if, and how, Koehler is welcomed in other states. 2 95 Moreover, if the decision is ripe for further judicial revieweither by sister-state courts or the Supreme Court-the issues raised by Koehler deserve greater academic attention. 291 . See supra note 79.
292. Such a theory would lead to the bizarre conclusion that the judgment debtor's assets are located in multiple places simultaneously. For example, if the assets are "present" wherever the garnishee is, they are simultaneously present at every branch or subsidiary of that garnishee institution. This creates serious problems when the garnishee is a multistate, or even a multinational, institution. See, e.g., supra note 226. Yet, as of now, it is too early to prophesize the impact of the decision. Thus, only until judgment creditors come flocking to New York courts, as some fear, can we say for sure that New York has become a "mecca" for creditors. What we may conclude, however, is this: The Koehler decision is an incredible one, arming judgment creditors with a significantly powerful tool to enable them to reach judgment debtors' assets located all over the world. And though it may have taken quite some time, perhaps now Abraham Lincoln's call that judgment creditors "must be somehow paid" will have finally fallen upon concerned ears. 
